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…in the eyes of Congress [1]
  …
“Our ships are simply too expensive.”
dan
“I believe the Navy needs to look very hard at their 
requirements process to determine if marginal extra 
capability is worth significant construction or integration 
costs.”
[1] The Honorable Gene Taylor (D-MS), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and 
Expeditionary Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Shipbuilding 
Eff ti i hi i t t t f h i J l 30 2009
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ec veness, n s open ng s a emen  or ear ngs on u y , .
Grey Ghost LLC
Navy Ship Acquisition
…In the eyes of the Navy [2]
  …
“Inarguably the underlying challenge – indeed, the pressing 
requirement – before us today in shipbuilding is affordability. 
“The fact is that ship costs are rising faster than our topline To          , ….  
this list I need also add performance, for on even our most mature 
programs, we have experienced cost growth as a result of 
performance shortfalls and quality escapes. 
“The reality is that there is no single fix to turn around this trend, 
but rather a large number of initiatives, practices, and standards 
that we need to attack across the board.”        
[2] The Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and 
Acquisition) and Vice Admiral Kevin M McCoy Commander Naval Sea Systems Command in
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     . , ,    ,  
prepared testimony for the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces of the House 
Armed Services Committee on Shipbuilding Effectiveness on July 30, 2009.
Grey Ghost LLC
Navy Ship Acquisition
…in the eyes of the Navy (cont) [2]
  …
“We need to ensure that our requirements are balanced by our 
resources. .... The key here is to inform the process with realistic 
cost estimates and realistic risk assessments at the front end. This         
drives the difficult decisions early, where there are true choices, 
and true opportunities. 
“ To meet these objecti es e m st be smart b ers The….    v , w  u    uy .  
acquisition workforce has been downsized over the past decade 
and a half to the extent that our professional corps has been 
stretched too thin and we have outsourced too much of our core 





…in the eyes of the Defense Department [3]
  …
• “Many weapons systems are over-budget, late, and don’t meet 
performance goals (e.g. GAO-06-391(March 2006)).
• “Lengthy and rigid acquisition process degrades ability to        
address rapidly changing irregular, catastrophic and disruptive 
threats.
• “Many of these problems can be traced to an ineffective design 
process.
• “Our present design tools are inadequate to produce an 
integrated design with few flaws.”
[3] Mr. Al Shaffer, Principal Deputy, Defense Research and Engineering, at the 2009 High 
Performance Computing (HPC) Modernization Program Users Group Conference 17June 2009
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Grey Ghost LLCWhat were they thinking?!?
They thought they knew the cost, performance, 
schedule and risk implications of their decisions.
In fact they did not ,   
Why not?  - four Root Causes
• Inexperienced ship design organizations
• Inexperienced ship design engineers
• Missing or inaccurate analysis software    
• Missing or late analysis inputs
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Grey Ghost LLCThe Design Challenge:
Precisely Balance a Host of Unknowns     
Mission Capability > Mission Requirement   
Signatures  <
Endurance  >




Mission Range & Duration
Required Area / Volume
Weight  
Stability  >
Propulsion Power  >
Power Production  >
HVAC Capacit >
Operating & Damage Conditions
Resistance
Installed Loads
HVAC Loads y  
Chilled Water Supply  >
Etc, Etc, Etc  >
 
Chilled Water Demand
Initial & Consequential Requirements
In the concept phase the designer must correctly predict the sum
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S lf t i d
  
• e -con a ne
• Self-propelled
• Multi-mission
S lf i d• e -susta ne
• System of Systems
• Parts count
– 100 x typical aircraft
– 1000 x typical plant



















10Navy’s need for ship information is long lasting
Retirement 
  
Grey Ghost LLCRoot Cause #1 
I i d Shi D i O i tinexper ence  p es gn rgan za ons
Since the advent of Acquisition Reform in the mid 1990’s         , 
every new ship design effort has been undertaken by a 
design organization formed specifically for that effort. 
Stark contrast with successful approach for other complex 
challenges
Stark contrast with Navy’s successful approach in the 70’s, 
80’s and early 90’s
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Grey Ghost LLCRoot Cause #2 
I i d Shi D i E i
Current problem with adverse demographics 
nexper ence  p es gn ng neers
Good initiatives to recruit raw talent
• DoD SMART Scholarships
• ONR Naval Research Enterprise Intern Program (NREIP)       
• NAVSEA/NSRP Engineering Education Consortium (NEEC)
• NAVSEA Naval Acquisition Intern Program
One initiative to recruit raw talent and develop ship        
design engineers
• ONR/NAVSEA/NSWC-CD Center for Innovation in Ship Design (CISD)




Mi i I d t A l i S ft
60 – 70% of ship design analysis areas have               
one or more of the following problems:
ss ng or na equa e na ys s o ware
      
Evaluation software is of poor quality
• poor algorithms inadequately represent underlying physical 
phenomena
• misleading user interface
• poor verification and/or validation
• application outside valid range
Evaluation software is unavailable
• new warfighting threats and/or technologies have emerged
• fundamental understanding of the physical phenomena involved is 
i d tna equa e 
• unconventional materials (eg, composites) have been introduced




Mi i L t A l i I t
Even if quality analysis software is available, it does 
ss ng or a e na ys s npu s
little good if timely and accurate input is not 
available. There is widespread need for
• More rapid development of candidate definition information
• More rapid transfer of definition information to analysis programs
• Surrogate definition from previous design efforts similar enough 
to the intended definition to support an estimate 





Grey Ghost LLCSea Story 1 – When we had an NDO
T-AGOS 19 
• Urgent need – 1984 SURTASS arrays deployed 
in high latitudes – motions intolerable for 
operators & systems
• SWATH hull form of unprecedented size
• Weight critical
• High structural loads
• Strict self-generated noise requirement   
• Accelerated development – 12 mo PD + CD         
(vs 12 mo PD + 12-18 mo CD)
• Shipbuilder participation in design
I i d b ild d ( b tl• nexper ence  u er won awar  su sequen y 
out of business)
Design accomplished IN STRIDE by experienced NDO
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Resulting ship worked as-advertised & as-required by operators
Grey Ghost LLCSea Story 2 – When we had an NDO
DDG 51
• PD / CD by NAVSEA-led team
• Complex multi-mission surface 
combatant
• Low signature design
• Cost limit
• Shipbuilder participation in design
• Externally-imposed size limit
Design accomplished IN STRIDE by experienced 
NDO although at greater expense ($26M) than 




Grey Ghost LLCSea Stories 3-6 – Since we eliminated 
our NDO




Designs accomplished by ad-hoc, rookie 
design organizations
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Grey Ghost LLCSea Story 7 – art of the possible
LSF II Project (Korea)
Studies began in 2004 after 
experimentation with Russian  -
built ACVs and some 
experience with US LCACs
LSF 631 delivered in April 2007
Can we respond rapidly to emerging needs?
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Grey Ghost LLCSolution Vector A
N ti l D i O i ti
Characteristics
a ona  es gn rgan za on
• Experienced, practiced and prepared in the organizational art of 
naval ship design.  
• Able to provide quality cost, performance, schedule and risk 
estimates for decision makers   .  
• Able to provide sound designs swiftly in response to emerging needs
• Focused on the Navy as its customer
• Providing an enterprise resource for ship acquisition
• Process focused and oriented to continuous process improvement
Roles of the NDO would include 
• Leadership of early stage design, 
• Establishment of guidelines and engineering standards for all phases 
of design and service life support 
• Focal point for fleet feedback.
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Grey Ghost LLCSolution Vector A
N ti l D i O i ti
Obstacles
a ona  es gn rgan za on
• The tyranny of the urgent
• Three year rotations
• Program-centric nature  
• Perceived cost
• Over-reliance on acquisition process
Sound Engineering is the Key to Success [for acquistion of 
complex systems] – RADM Wayne Meyer
“What’s needed now is for Navy leadership to evaluate the 
alternatives, garner the required support, make a decision and 
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move aggressively to implement the decision.” – Pete Gale
Grey Ghost LLCConclusions and 
Recommendations
Our Naval ship acquisition leaders need and deserve       
better estimates of cost, performance, schedule 
and risk at critical early-stage decision points
Ei ht l ti l i i l ti t hg  re a ve y nexpens ve so u on vec ors ave 
been identified to provide better estimates
In particular the Navy should establish and sustain a 
National Design Organization with the requisite 
skill and experience to meet the design challenge
Acquisition Research Symposium participants    
should strengthen ties with the ship design and 
engineering community – many ASNE & SNAME 
events focus on similar issues
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